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Sex-Biased Parental Investment
among Contemporary Chinese
Peasants: Testing the Trivers-Willard
Hypothesis
Liqun Luo*, Wei Zhao and Tangmei Weng
Department of Sociology, Central China Normal University, Wuhan, China
The Trivers-Willard hypothesis predicts that high-status parents will bias their investment
to sons, whereas low-status parents will bias their investment to daughters. Among
humans, tests of this hypothesis have yielded mixed results. This study tests the
hypothesis using data collected among contemporary peasants in Central South China.
We use current family status (rated by our informants) and father’s former class identity
(assigned by the Chinese Communist Party in the early 1950s) as measures of parental
status, and proportion of sons in offspring and offspring’s years of education as measures
of parental investment. Results show that (i) those families with a higher former class
identity such as landlord and rich peasant tend to have a higher socioeconomic status
currently, (ii) high-status parents are more likely to have sons than daughters among their
biological offspring, and (iii) in higher-status families, the years of education obtained by
sons exceed that obtained by daughters to a larger extent than in lower-status families.
Thus, the first assumption and the two predictions of the hypothesis are supported by
this study. This article contributes a contemporary Chinese case to the testing of the
Trivers-Willard hypothesis.
Keywords: Trivers-Willard hypothesis, natural selection, parental investment, sex ratio, education, Chinese
peasants
INTRODUCTION
According to the Trivers-Willard hypothesis (TWH), natural selection has shaped the way that
parents differentially allocate resources, such as time and energy, to their offspring by sex: parents
in good condition during the period of parental investment will invest more in sons, while parents
in poor condition during parental investment will invest more in daughters (Trivers and Willard,
1973). The TWH authors hold that the hypothesis is applicable to all sexually reproducing species
including humans, and when applied to humans, “good condition” or “bad condition” refers to
differentiation on a socioeconomic scale. Parental investment in offspring before birthmainly refers
to resource allocation involved in conception and gestation, and is ultimately manifest in sex ratios,
body size differences, etc., at birth. On the other hand, parental investment also takes place after the
birth of offspring, including food provisioning, lactation, and protection of offspring, etc.
The reasoning of the TWH is based on two assumptions: (i) there is a positive correlation
between the condition of parents during parental investment and the condition of offspring at
adulthood, and (ii) advantages in condition have greater effects on adult male reproductive success
compared to the effects on adult female reproductive success. Thus, following the logic of natural
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selection, it is not difficult to arrive at two specific predictions
of the TWH: as parental condition declines, parents tend to (i)
produce a lower sex ratio of males to females at birth, and (ii)
allocate relatively more resources to daughters postnatally.
Tests of the TWH
There is widespread evidence that the two assumptions of the
TWH conform to the reality of human societies. For human
societies, the first assumption holds that there is relatively stable
intergenerational transfers of socioeconomic status. Probably
this was most evident in agricultural societies, in which most
people’s class position was largely determined by family origin
and typically remained unchanged for life (Sanderson, 1999).
The weakening of social inequality in modern societies has not
eliminated the intergenerational transmission of occupational
status and wealth at all. Many studies show clear associations
between the family of origin and occupation, income or
educational attainment, in contemporary Western countries
(Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; Solon, 2002; Breen, 2004) and
other countries such as China (Lin and Bian, 1991; Gong et al.,
2012), though they may differ on how the intergenerational
transfers vary across countries.
As for the second assumption of the TWH, it implies that
higher socioeconomic status should have a greater effect on
adult male reproductive success than on that of adult females,
and that low-status females’ reproductive success should exceed
low-status males. The sex difference in reproductive success co-
varying with socioeconomic status is strongly supported by data
from traditional societies (Betzig, 2012). Moreover, as Hopcroft
and Martin (2014, 2016) put it, much recent evidence from
the contemporary U.S. and European countries points out that
high economic status does promote males’, rather than females’
reproductive success (Hopcroft, 2005; Fieder and Huber, 2007;
Nettle and Pollet, 2008), and lower-income males are less likely
to have children (Hopcroft, 2005; Weeden et al., 2006; Barthold
et al., 2012). The similar phenomena should take place in other
countries such as contemporary China. Much research observes
that nearly all women and better educated, more wealthy men
marry in China, while the unmarried people mainly consist of
low-income and low-education men (Sharygin et al., 2013). In
fact, in China, more than 90% of all unmarried people aged 28–49
are men who have not completed high school (Hesketh and Zhu,
2006). As reproduction usually happens within marriages and
families, these studies indicate that the reproductive success of
low-status Chinese males is lower. Thus the second assumption
of the TWH is at least partially supported for China.
Among those tests of the TWH, however, very few examine
whether the two assumptions of this hypothesis are consistent
to realities of the population studied. An exception is Bereczkei
and Dunbar (1997). According to this study, Hungarian Gypsies
invest more heavily in daughters than in sons compared to
Hungarians who have a relatively higher status. Moreover, the
Gypsies have more grandchildren via their daughters, while the
data do not show significant differences for the Hungarians.
Hence, the second assumption of the TWH is partially vindicated.
As for tests of the two predictions of the TWH in humans,
they have yielded mixed results. While historical studies and
small-scale studies in contemporary societies tend to support the
TWH, large-scale studies in contemporary societies sometimes
contradict it, at least its postnatal investment version (Cronk,
2007). The most important reason for those studies not
supporting the TWH (e.g., Freese and Powell, 1999; Keller et al.,
2001; Beaulieu and Bugental, 2008; Schnettler, 2010) probably
comes from problematic measures of family socioeconomic
status and postnatal parental investment (Cronk, 2007; Hopcroft
and Martin, 2014). These studies use self-reported parental
income or education to gauge family status. Self-reports of
income may be biased due to the sensitivity of personal income
information, and education can roughly, but for understandable
reasons, inadequately indicate overall family status. Also, these
studies examine postnatal parental investments in offspring
at relatively young ages, such as interacting with children.
Probably such investments only have a comparatively remote
relationship with children’s future reproductive success, while
the Trivers-Willard effect in certain contemporary societies
may only or primarily involve those investments that have a
stronger and more direct influence. Like parental income or
education for measuring family status, parental investments in
children at young ages may not be enough to capture a weak
relationship.
To avoid the methodological problems of the above-
mentioned studies, Hopcroft (2005) and Hopcroft and Martin
(2014, 2016) use children’s educational attainment to measure
postnatal parental investment, on the basis that children’s
educational attainment strongly affects their economic, social
and reproductive success in contemporary American society.
In our view, the effect of education in contemporary Chinese
society is similar to that in the United States. In the past decades,
income growth in China has been uneven, most rapidly among
the educated (Goh et al., 2008). In rural China, education is
strongly correlated with both non-farm income and farm income
(Knight et al., 2009). In urban China, almost half of the growth
in income inequality is due to educational inequality (Zhou,
2009). Education also promotes social prestige. Traditionally a
Confucianist country, China has a long history of respecting
teachers and the educated, as is manifested in an ancient Chinese
saying—a teacher for 1 day is a father for life. Surveys on
how residents rate prestige of various occupations in China’s
Beijing (Lin and Xie, 1988) and Tianjin (Bian, 1996) show that
occupations needingmore education such as scientists, university
teachers, physicians, and engineers, are most valued. As women
tend to marry up the socioeconomic scale, education boosting
income and prestige will also boost men’s reproductive success.
Education also further women’s reproductive success.
According to Schwartz (2010), a little higher than 50% of
American married couples are educationally homogamous,
that is, they have similar amounts of education. For Chinese
women first married between 1970 and 2001, the percentage of
educational homogamy keeps above 49.2 across all six cohorts
classified by marriage date, and is even higher than 60 for
those married after 1990 (Han, 2010). Since education helps a
woman find a more wealthy high-education husband, parental
investment in a daughter’s education potentially promotes her
marital and reproductive success.
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Similar to Hopcroft (2005) and Hopcroft and Martin (2014,
2016), this study uses years of education received by children
to gauge postnatal parental investment. More years of education
mean more investment by parents. Also, different from former
studies such as Keller et al. (2001), the present study uses
third-party reports to obtain two measures of overall parental
status. First, assuming a relatively stable intergenerational
transmission of socioeconomic status, we use current family
socioeconomic status as a measure of parental status during
parental investment. second, as former family class identity
reflects family socioeconomic status for quite a long time—before
the early 1950s and since the 1980s, we think that including it as
a measure of parental status during parental investment besides
current family status is justified.
Here, what “previous family class identity” means in the
cultural background of China needs to be explained briefly.
During the Land Reform by the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) in the late 1940s and early 1950s, each peasant family
was assigned one of seven class identities on the basis of
family economic status: landlord, rich peasant, upper middle
peasant, middle middle peasant, lower middle peasant, poor
peasant, and landless laborer. We did field work in the Hunan
Province. The Province was taken over by the CCP in 1950
and the land reform there should be conducted in the early
1950s. At that time, some land and other property of landlords
and rich peasants were forfeited and redistributed to landless
laborers, poor peasants, and lower middle peasants, to effect a
more equitable distribution of wealth. Before the Land Reform,
landlords and rich peasants were at the top level of the
sociopolitical and economic hierarchies in rural China, middle
peasantsmiddle, and poor and landless laborers bottom. After the
Reform, previous poor and lower-middle peasant families were
privileged in many aspects including education and employment,
while previous rich and middle class families, especially landlord
and rich-peasant families, were disadvantagedly discriminated,
until class identities were officially abolished in 1979 (Unger,
1982; Sato and Li, 2008). From the early 1950s to the early
1980s, educational attainment of males was highly egalitarian
with respect to social origins (Deng and Treiman, 1997), though
evidence about the relationship between social origins and
income and women’s education is needed. Despite more than two
decades of discrimination, children from former landlord, rich-
peasant, or middle-peasant families have been more likely to be
better educated and to have more family wealth than those from
poor or lower-middle peasant families since the 1980s (Sato and
Li, 2008, 2013).
Goals and Models
The first goal of this study is to test the first assumption of
the TWH, relatively stable intergenerational transmission of
socioeconomic status, with data about contemporary Chinese
peasants.We expect to find that the higher the family status in the
past generations which can be measured by former family class
identity, the higher the current family status. In addition, parental
age, education, and number of offspring affect current family
status. Since the 1980s, China has been experiencing a rapid
process of urbanization, during which rural-urban migration
is the main source of urban population growth (Chen et al.,
2013). Permanent migrants as a whole are young and have
higher educational attainments than non-migrants or temporary
migrants (Fan, 2008). If we observe older parents and their
families in a rural community, we expect that they currently
have a lower status there, because some better educated peasants
with similar ages to theirs have migrated to cities. As education
promotes income, better educated parents and their families
should have a higher socioeconomic status. Moreover, sons
and daughters can support parents in a variety of ways, e.g.,
helping manage family business. If we observe parents with more
offspring, we also expect that they have a higher status locally.
Second, we wanted to test the first prediction of the TWH,
that is, higher-status parents are more likely to have sons than
daughters among their biological progeny.We expect that the sex
ratios of each peasant family are affected not only by parental
status, but also by parental age, education, and number of
progeny. First, we assume that older or lower-education parents
should be more likely to have been influenced by the traditional
son-preference culture and thus to have aborted a female fetus or
maltreated their female infants. Other things being equal, the sex
ratios at birth for these parents should be higher than others.
Also, number of offspring should affect sex ratio of each
family. A coercive birth control policy has been implementing in
China since the late 1970s. The basic birth control policy in the
rural area studied before 2016 is that amarried couple are allowed
to have a second child if the first birth is a girl, as is sometimes
called “1.5-child” policy (For a review of China’s fertility policy at
both the local and national levels, see Gu et al., 2007). If a couple
only wants a child, son-preference culture might press them to
manipulate the sex of the first birth. For a couple having only
one or two sons and no daughters, if they cannot afford the fine
levied by the government for an unauthorized birth, they would
be less likely to have one more child, since they already have
had sons. Further, a larger number of offspring means a larger
probability of having at least a son. In this case, parents are less
likely to manipulate the sex of the next child if they really want
one more child. In fact, China’s abnormal sex ratios at birth in
the past decades (Banister, 2004) is mainly due to manipulation
of sex among first and second births (Ebenstein, 2010). All these
should cause a negative correlation between number of offspring
and sex ratio of each family.
Finally, we wanted to test the second prediction of the
TWH that high-status parents invest more in sons postnatally.
Similar to the above model, when variables such as parental
age, education, and number of offspring are controlled for, we
expect that higher-status parents invest relatively more in sons’
education, while lower-status parents invest relatively more in
daughters’.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Prior to data collection, we confirmed with Central China
Normal University’ s Human Research Ethics Committee that
no ethical approval was required for this kind of study, if only
participants agreed to participate verbally. We do no report
results for any individual participant, but only aggregated results.
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Data Collection
Data were collected in July and August 2015 in five adjacent
Han villages named Gaotang, Outang, Shuidong, Xianghua,
and Xiaoling, respectively, in Shaodong County, central Hunan
Province, South Central China. TheHanChinese are themajority
ethnic group in China, constituting around 90% of the total
population. Presently around 50% of the total population in
China live in rural areas. According to the information disclosed
on the official website of the Shaodong County Government, the
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in Shaodong in 2014
was around 4800 US dollars, while the figure for China as a whole
was around 7300 US dollars in the same year, in terms of the
present USD to RMB exchange rate.
To collect the data, we first copied the pages of household
registers about family heads from the police department. Under
China’s household registration system, usually every family
register in a local police department the basic information about
each family member’ sex, birth date, ethnicity, etc. But the
registers do not necessarily perfectly reflect the birth, death, and
migration of a local population. For example, those children
who were born with no official approval and whose parents
were unable to pay the fines levied by the government usually
are excluded from the registration system. The registers also
do not cover the information about family members’ current
socioeconomic status and previous family class identity, which
is crucial for this study.
As the registers provided the information about each famiy
head’s sex and age, then we tried to find two informants in each
village to obtain other relevant information about each family.
One informant was a retired older-than-60 village head, Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) branch secretary in the village, or village
accountant. The other was the current village head, CCP branch
secretary in the village, village accountant, or a teacher of the local
primary school, with amiddle age.We paid each of them about 32
US dollars as reward in advance. They informed us of each family
head’s education level, current family socioeconomic status in
the local community, fathers’ previous class identity, and each
biological son’s and daughter’s birth year and education level. All
the informants kept living in the investigated area for decades.
In every village, usually both informants easily concurred on the
above information.
The reason that we did not directly interview the family heads
for primary data was that many peasants were oversensitive
to questions about offspring, current family status, and father’s
former class identity. In our preliminary fieldwork conducted
in June 2015, an interviewed peasant with a landlord family
origin told us that his family origin was poor peasant, presumably
because his father was persecuted to death during Chairman
Mao’s era only for being a previous landlord and this event
connected to class identity was a trauma for him. Like many
Western people, some Chinese peasants regard personal or
familial socioeconomic status as privacy. Moreover, many
peasant parents have one or more unauthorized births. They
would not like strangers to know this, lest this would be reported
to the local government.
We finally obtained intact information about 1418 family
heads (1241 males and 177 females). See Table 1 below.
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics for family heads.
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Sex (Male = 1, N = 1418) 0.88 0.33 0 1
Age (N = 1418) 59.87 12.83 25 97
Years of education (N = 1418) 7.60 2.90 0.00 16.00
Number of offspring (N = 1418) 2.27 1.10 0.00 7
Current family socioeconomic status
(N = 1418)
2.09 0.64 1 3
Former class identity (N = 1418) 1.13 0.42 1 3
Proportion of sons in offspring (N = 1368) 0.59 0.31 0.00 1.00
Ratio of sons’ average education to
daughters’ (N = 674)a
1.13 0.31 0.00 4.50
Offspring sex (Male=1, N = 2818)b 0.55 0.50 0 1
Offspring’s years of education (N = 2818)b 10.40 2.79 0.00 22.00
aThe variable ratio of sons’ average education to daughters’in this table and Table 5 only
involves those family heads who have at least a son and a daughter and whose offspring
are at least 18 years old.
bThe variables offspring sex and offspring’s years of education in this table and Table 4
only involve those offspring who are at least 18 years of age.
Outcome Variables
Testing the first assumption of the TWH, we used current
family socioeconomic status as the outcome variable. A score
of 1 means bad family socioeconomic status in the local
community, a score of 2 means average status, and 3 means good
status.
In our pilot fieldwork in January 2015, we discovered
that Chinese peasants usually classified their general family
socioeconomic status into three categories of “bad,” “average,”
and “good.” More specific classifications seemed to confound
them sometimes. It is this trichotomy that we finally used to
collect the data presented here.
In testing the first prediction of the TWH, we used proportion
of sons in offspring as the outcome variable. We divided the
number of sons of each family head by the total number of
his/her offspring to obtain this variable, for all those with at
least a child. For example, if a family head has a son and a
daughter, he or she will obtain a score of 0.5 on the variable.
The greater the value, the relatively more prenatal investment in
sons.
As for testing of the second prediction of the TWH, we
used offspring’s years of education as an outcome variable, for
all the 2818 offspring (in the 1230 families) who were at least
18 years of age. Also, for the 674 family heads who had at
least a son and a daughter and all of whose offspring were at
least 18 years old, we divided the average years of education of
sons by the average years of education of daughters to obtain a
new variable, ratio of sons’ average education to daughters’, for
gauging sex-biased postnatal parental investment. For example,
for a family head, if two sons’ years of education are 6 and 9
years, and two daughters’ years of education are 6 and 16, then
the average years of education for sons and for daughters will
be 7.5 and 11, and the variable ratio of sons’ average education
to daughters’ will have a score of 7.5/11=0.68. The greater
the value, the relatively more postnatal parental investment in
sons.
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Independent Variables
In testing the first assumption of the TWH, we used each family
head’s age, years of education, number of offspring, and father’s
former class identity as independent variables. As current family
socioeconomic status is an ordinal variable and the test of parallel
lines showed that the data did not meet the proportional odds
assumption for performing an ordinal logit regression analysis
(Norus˘is, 2012), the above variables were entered into an ordinal
probit regression.
The variable former class identity indicates each family head’s
father’s previous class identity. In the Chinese context, a person’s
father’s or paternal grandfather’s former class identity is also
regarded as the person’s previous family class identity. For the
variable, score of 1, 2, or 3 mean that the previous class identity is
poor peasant or landless laborer, middle class peasant, or landlord
or rich peasant, respectively. The three kinds of class identities
correspond to good-class origins, middle-class origins, and bad-
class origins from the 1950s to the late 1970s in Maoist China
(Unger, 1982; Deng and Treiman, 1997).
In testing the first prediction of the TWH, we used each
family head’s age, years of education, current family socioeconomic
status, and former class identity as independent variables.
Considering that the dependent variable had only a few values
and that the proportional odds assumption was not met,
we performed an ordinal probit regression of the dependent
variable.
In testing the second prediction of the TWH, we performed
two multilevel regressions of offspring’s year of education. In both
models, family head’s age, years of education, and number of
offspring were used to estimate random effects.Offspring’s sex was
coded as Male = 1, Female = 0. In model 1, offspring’s sex, each
family head’s current family socioeconomic status and former class
identity, and offspring’s sex∗ current family socioeconomic status,
were used to estimate fixed effects. On the other hand, offspring’s
sex, each family head’s current family socioeconomic status and
former class identity, and offspring’s sex∗ former class identity,
were included in model 2 to estimate fixed effects.
All data analyses were carried out using STATA. All tests were
one-tailed unless otherwise specified.
RESULTS
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used
in the analysis. Zero-order Pearson correlations are given in the
Appendix.
Testing the First Assumption of the TWH
As expected, all the four independent variables are significant
predictors of the dependent variable current family
socioeconomic status (Table 2). The value of tolerance for
each independent variable is much greater than the 0.10
collinearity threshold. This means that despite the correlations
between the predictor variables the independent effect of each
variable on the dependent variable was statistically confirmed.
This model shows that younger, better educated family heads
who have more offspring and whose family’s socioeconomic
status before the early 1950s was higher, tend to have a higher
family socioeconomic status currently. As far as the first
assumption of the TWH is concerned, the model shows that
when the other three independent variables are controlled,
former class identity has an independent, positive influence on
current family status. The effect size (Spearman rank correlation
coefficient rs) between former class identity and current family
socioeconomic status is 0.079 (n= 1418, p= 0.001).
Another interesting finding is concerned with the relationship
between number of offspring and family status. The Chinese
government has been propagandizing for decades “the more
children, the poorer,” to urge people to control birth. Ironically,
when number of offspring was assumed to really influence
subsequent socioeconomic status and was entered into the above
regression, we found that it could enhance, rather than weaken
family status.
Testing the First Prediction of the TWH
Results of the test of prenatal investment in offspring (Table 3)
show that all the independent variables except years of education
are statistically significant. Similar to the first regression analysis
above, the value of tolerance for each independent variable is
much greater than the 0.10 collinearity threshold. Directions
of the relationships in the model are consistent with our
expectation—a family head with an older age, fewer offspring,
and higher current family status and former class identity, is more
likely to have sons.
As the value of current family socioeconomic status and
former class identity rises, the mean value of proportion of sons
in offspring keeps rising (Table 5). The effect sizes (Spearman rs)
for current family socioeconomic status and former class identity
in predicting proportion of sons in offspring are 0.052 (n= 1368,
TABLE 2 | Ordered probit regression of current family socioeconomic
status on independent variables.
Independent variables Coef. SE p Tolerancea
Age −0.006 0.003 0.029 0.519
Years of education 0.129 0.014 0.000 0.616
Number of offspring 0.167 0.032 0.000 0.760
Former class identity 0.129 0.073 0.039 0.980
N = 1418, Pseudo R2 = 0.062.
aThe values of tolerance in Tables 2 and 3were obtained from the Ordinary Least Squares
regression using the same dependent and independent variables (Menard, 2002).
TABLE 3 | Ordered probit regression of proportion of sons in offspring on
independent variables.
Independent variables Coef. SE p Tolerance
Age 0.014 0.003 0.000 0.486
Years of education −0.014 0.014 0.144 0.582
Number of offspring −0.358 0.036 0.000 0.644
Current family socioeconomic status 0.138 0.049 0.003 0.918
Former class identity 0.152 0.070 0.015 0.979
N = 1368, Pseudo R2 = 0.024.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 August 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1215
Luo et al. Sex-Biased Parental Investment
p= 0.028) and 0.042 (n= 1368, p= 0.060), respectively. To sum
up, the first prediction of the TWH is confirmed.
Testing the Second Prediction of the TWH
Results of the test of postnatal investment in offspring (Table 4)
show that for family heads with a higher current family status,
their offspring attain more years of education than others.
Contrary to our expectation, in model 2, former class identity
is negatively associated with offspring’s years of education. We
suspect that this is due to that some better educated peasants with
a family origin of landlord, rich peasant or middle peasant have
moved out to cities. This model also shows significant interaction
terms of offspring sex by current family status or previous family
class identity in the positive direction predicted by the TWH—An
increase in current family status or former family class identity
produces a greater increase in the education of sons than of
daughters.
The mean value of ratio of sons’ average education to
daughters’ in each family goes up hand in hand with current
family socioeconomic status and former class identity (Table 5).
The trends are consistent and stable, though the changes
are small. The effect sizes (Spearman rs) for current family
socioeconomic status and former class identity in predicting
ratio of sons’ average education to daughters’ are 0.077
(n = 674, p = 0.023) and 0.081 (n = 674, p = 0.018),
respectively. To conclude, the second prediction of the TWH is
supported.
DISCUSSION
Taken together, the data from this study support the validity
of the first assumption and the two predictions of the TWH
among contemporary Chinese peasants. First, we found that
those family heads whose father had a higher class identity
assigned by the CCP in the early 1950s tended to have a family
with a higher socioeconomic status currently. This means that
there were transfers of socioeconomic status across generations
to some extent in the previous decades. Thus the first assumption
of the TWH is supported. Probably this is the first time for
testing that assumption in a population studied. Second, when
parental socioeconomic status during parental investment was
measured by both current status and former class identity, we
found that high-status parents were more likely to have sons than
daughters among their biological offspring. Finally, the data show
that as family heads’ current family status or former class identity
increases, the education of sons increases to a larger extent than
that of daughters. This means that high-status parents invest
relatively more in the education of sons compared to low-status
parents.
In humans, the TWH is essentially involved with the
relationships between parental socioeconomic status and sex-
biased parental investment in children. Similar to several earlier
studies (e.g., Bereczkei and Dunbar, 1997; Cox, 2003; Hopcroft,
2005; Pollet et al., 2009; Wallner et al., 2012; Hopcroft and
Martin, 2014, 2016), this study based the measure of parental
status on overall status, and the measure of parental investment
on investment in the education of offspring. All the studies
TABLE 4 | Multilevel regression of offspring’s years of education on
independent variables: fixed-effect parametersa.
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2
Coef. p Coef. p
Intercept 8.552 (0.323) 0.000 8.613 (0.314) 0.000
Offspring’s sex (Male=1) 0.239 (0.272) 0.379 0.190 (0.221) 0.389
Current family
socioeconomic status
0.927 (0.128) 0.000 1.090 (0.106) 0.000
Former class identity −0.206 (0.157) 0.188 −0.554 (0.192) 0.004
Offspring’s sex*current
family socioeconomic status
0.282 (0.125) 0.024
Offspring’s sex*former class
identity
0.553 (0.179) 0.002
Standard errors in parentheses.
Number of offspring = 2818, number of families = 1230, two-tailed tests.
aThe inclusion of the interaction terms in the model causes collinearity to some extent.
Because collinearity in this case can be safely ignored (Friedrich, 1982), we do not report
tolerance values here.
TABLE 5 | Means of proportion of sons in offspring and means of ratio of
sons’ average education to daughters’ by family status.
Mean of proportion
of sons in offspring
Mean of ratio of sons’
average education to
daughters’
Current family socioeconomic
Status = 1a
0.544 (N = 195) 1.114 (N = 103)
Current family socioeconomic
status = 2
0.588 (N = 824) 1.117 (N = 396)
Current family socioeconomic
status = 3
0.613 (N = 349) 1.180 (N = 175)
Former class identity = 1b 0.584 (N = 1232) 1.124 (N = 597)
Former class identity = 2 0.600 (N = 91) 1.181 (N = 55)
Former class identity = 3 0.672 (N = 45) 1.242 (n = 22)
aFor the variable current family socioeconomic status, a score of 1 means bad family
socioeconomic status in the local community, a score of 2 means average status in the
local community, and 3 means good status.
bFor the variable former class identity, a score of 1 means that the previous family class
identity is poor peasant or landless laborer, a score of 2 means that the previous family
class identity is middle peasant, and a score of 3 means landlord or rich peasant.
obtained positive results regarding the TWH, in contrast to
some other studies (e.g., Freese and Powell, 1999; Keller et al.,
2001; Beaulieu and Bugental, 2008; Schnettler, 2010) that used
different measures. As the TWH only indicates a weak effect,
the usage of more proper measures of parental status, and
parental investment such as educational investment that is more
important for children’s future reproductive success, should have
been more suited for testing this hypothesis.
Along with previous studies (Bereczkei and Dunbar, 1997;
Cox, 2003; Hopcroft, 2005; Hopcroft and Martin, 2014, 2016),
this study shows that on average the educational benefits of
having high-status parents is greater for sons than for daughters.
Furthermore, the present study used the variable ratio of sons’
average education to daughters to examine sex difference in
educational investment in offspring within each family. In fact,
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we found that the mean value of this variable kept rising as family
status increased.
Also, similar to such studies supporting the TWH as Voland
et al. (1997) and Cronk (2000), this study focuses on a social class
(peasants), rather than the whole population of a nation. In our
view, a social class (e.g., peasants or manual workers) seems to be
more similar to a population in a biological sense than a whole
nation. More specifically, first, studies show that people tend to
marry within their social group or marry someone who is close
to them in status (Kalmijn, 1998). Second, members of a social
class should be more likely to live in similar or even the same
residential areas. Third, human social behaviors should occur
within each social class to a very large degree. If a social class such
as peasants is differentiated within itself on a socioeconomic scale
and meets the two assumption of the TWH, the TWH should be
applicable.We expect that future human studies testing the TWH
in such social classes will lendmore support to the hypothesis that
was developed from a biological perspective, though variation
between different social classes in parental investment might
sometimes cause the TWH inapplicable to a whole nation.
But some people may complain that cultural factors are
ignored in the testing of the TWH. In fact, many studies (e.g., Li
and Cooney, 1993; Gupta et al., 2003) insist that East and South
Asian countries such as China have a deep-rooted, universal
cultural norm of son preference. This may raise the question
that whether or not the TWH is applicable in these regions.
In our view, however, the problem of son preference has been
greatly exaggerated. We have never seen any quantitative study
to convincingly prove that almost everyone in these countries,
regardless of social class or socioeconomic status, prefers sons
to daughters. As we mentioned above, the TWH can apply to
every social class that is differentiated on a socioeconomic scale.
In this case, probably son preference would have evolved out first
in high status individuals in each social class. According to the
theory of cultural evolution developed mainly by anthropologists
and biologists, there are two key social learning biases, that is,
payoff bias (individuals tend to learn from other individuals who
have succeeded to some extent in terms of higher payoffs) (Boyd
and Richerson, 1985) and conformist bias (individuals tend to
learn the most common behaviors in a population) (Henrich
and Boyd, 1998). If these two biases hold, it is not surprising
that many or even most individuals in a country such as China
have a cultural norm of son preference. Compared to natural
selection, however, culture itself is only a minor force for molding
human behavior. Moreover, organisms including humans often
deceive themselves and humans do not necessarily follow what
they have said about themselves or their cultural norms (Trivers,
2011). To summarize, that many individuals hold a cultural norm
of son preference does not contradict the TWH. As long as
the two assumptions of the TWH hold, son preference and the
consequent distorted sex ratio will not change the predictions of
the hypothesis fundamentally.
The TWH provides an evolutionary or ultimate explanation
for sex-biased parental investment, concerned with the
fitness consequences of parental behaviors. The present
study discovers what the TWH predicts in contemporary
Chinese peasants. However, the specific mechanisms by which
the results come about are unclear. For example, peasants’
choice of educational investment in offspring may be directly
influenced by schooling costs or manual labor needs. As
ultimate and mechanistic or proximate explanations are
complementary, future studies that clarify the mechanisms will
help us achieve a fuller understanding of the Trivers-Willard
effect.
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